Rider Maersk Global Shipping Management System Case Discussion I am attaching two cases.Read them and answer the questions. Each should be single space one

Rider Maersk Global Shipping Management System Case Discussion I am attaching two cases.Read them and answer the questions. Each should be single space one page. MLA citation please. Management Information Systems 16e
KENNETH C. LAUDON AND JANE P. LAUDON
CHAPTER 8
CASE 2
SUMMARY
SECURING INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Cyberespionage: The Chinese Threat
This video examines the economic and national security costs of cyberespionage.
Cyberespionage involves the theft of intellectual property, as well as valuable
situational and personal information, using surreptitious means on the Internet. While
many advanced nations engage in cyberespionage, China has been implicated in
many major cyberespionage programs aimed at the United States. L= 21:14.
Systems
CNBC – Cyber Espionage: The Chinese Threat
URL
CASE

Cyberespionage is very different from cyberwarfare. The objective in cyberespionage is to, without detection, gain access to computer systems that contain valuable
commercial and/or military information; to remain in place for continuous data gathering; and to remove data from the target system. The point is not to destroy enemy
systems, but instead to colocate inside them and continuously drain information. This
is similar to the goals of the British intelligence agency MI6 during World War II, when
they broke the military codes of the Germans quite early in the war. MI6 spent a great
deal of effort to insure the Germans never discovered their communications were
being closely monitored and intercepted for over four years. In contrast, the objective of cyberwarfare is to destroy and disrupt enemy capabilities. When cyberwarfare
continued
Chapter 8, Case 2 Cyberespionage: The Chinese Threat
2
succeeds, the very fact of succeeding permits the enemy to become aware of the intrusion and take steps to defend itself.
In October 2011, in a report to Congress by the Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive, national security officials concluded that foreign collectors of sensitive economic information are able to operate in cyberspace with relatively
little risk of detection by their private sector targets. The proliferation of malicious software, prevalence of cybertool sharing, use of hackers as proxies, and routing of operations through third countries make it difficult to attribute responsibility for computer
network intrusions. Cybertools have enhanced the economic espionage threat, and the
Intelligence Community (IC) judges the use of such tools is already a larger threat than
more traditional espionage methods.
The threat comes from adversaries as well as partners. Allegedly, according to American
and European media and governments, Chinese actors are the world’s most active and
persistent perpetrators of economic espionage. U.S. private sector firms and cybersecurity specialists have reported an onslaught of computer network intrusions that
have originated in China, but the intelligence community cannot definitively confirm
who is responsible because of the possibility that the attacks originate elsewhere
but use compromised Chinese computers to implement the attacks. Russia’s intelligence services come in second place. They are also conducting a range of activities to
collect economic information and technology from U.S. targets. In addition, some U.S.
allies and partners use their broad access to U.S. institutions to acquire sensitive U.S.
economic and technology information, primarily through aggressive elicitation and
other human intelligence (HUMINT) tactics.
In Europe, both France and the U.S. military are accused of leading the largest cyberespionage operations against European countries, even larger than China or Russia.
According to leaked U.S. diplomatic cables (WikiLeaks) from the U.S. embassy in Berlin,
“French espionage is so widespread that the damages it causes the German economy
are larger as a whole than those caused by China or Russia.” Berry Smutny, the head of
German satellite company OHB Technology, is quoted in the diplomatic note as saying:
“France is the Empire of Evil in terms of technology theft, and Germany knows it.” The
United States is also the object of commercial and military espionage originating from
its major Middle Eastern ally, Israel. U.S. national security officials consider Israel to be, at
times, a frustrating ally and a genuine counterintelligence threat.
Reviewing all the various reports and allegations, from the United States, to Europe,
and China, it appears that all nation states, and their commercial affiliates, engage in a
variety of activities that be could called espionage, or intelligence gathering. In some
cases these activities are illegal, or skirt the laws of both the target and the initiating
states. The size of these cyberespionage activities reflects both the economic strength
of the nations involved (advanced countries like the United States and European councontinued
Chapter 8, Case 2 Cyberespionage: The Chinese Threat
3
tries arguably have the largest and most sophisticated programs), and the demand in
developing countries for stolen intellectual property.
It is also difficult to estimate the economic cost of these thefts to the U.S. economy. In
a 2011 report to Congress from the Office of National Counterintelligence, intelligence
experts concluded that the economic cost was in the billions of dollars, and millions of
jobs.
The potential impact of cyberespionage is illustrated in the following examples.
Google Attack: Commercial Espionage and Punishment
Google announced in January 2010 that it had been the target of a highly sophisticated
Chinese cyberattack. At least 34 other companies, including Yahoo, Symantec, Adobe,
Northrop Grumman, and Dow Chemical, were attacked at the same time. According to
the experts, the attacks at defense contractors were aimed at obtaining information on
weapons systems, while those on technology companies sought out valuable source
code that powers these companies’ software applications. At Google, the attackers also
gained access to the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights advocates in the United
States, Europe, and China.
Experts say that the attacks followed the familiar “phishing” technique. A recipient
opens a message that purports to be from someone he knows and, not suspecting
malicious intent, opens an attachment containing a malicious program that embeds
in his computer. That program then paves the way for downloading and concealing
additional programs that allow the attacker to gain total control over the recipient’s
computer.
Subsequent investigation determined that the Google break-in started with an instant
message sent to a Google employee in China who was using Microsoft’s Messenger
program. By clicking on a link within this instant message, the employee inadvertently
downloaded malware that allowed the attackers to gain access to the employee’s
computer and then, through that computer, access to the computers of a critical group
of software developers at Google headquarters.
Joint Strike Fighter
The Joint Strike Fighter, also known as the F-35 Lightning II, is reportedly the costliest
and most technically challenging weapons program the DoD has ever attempted.
Intruders apparently entered this program repeatedly during the 2007–2009 period
through vulnerabilities in the networks of contractors working on the program. These
include Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and BAE Systems. One example of the
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Chapter 8, Case 2 Cyberespionage: The Chinese Threat
4
sophistication of these attacks is that the intruders inserted technology that encrypts
the data as it is being stolen. As a result, investigators cannot determine exactly what
data has been taken. The source of the attacks was traced back to China.
GhostNet
Information Warfare Monitor, a Canadian research organization, conducted a detailed
investigation of Chinese cyberespionage against the Tibetan community and Tibetan
Government-in-Exile during the period June 2008 to August 2009. It identified an
extensive network of cyberpenetration of Tibetan targets that it called GhostNet. This
is relevant here not just because of the successful penetration of Tibetan targets, but
for what was learned about successful penetration of other targets during a second
phase of this investigation.
This investigation led to the discovery of four commercial Internet access accounts
located in Hainan, China, that received data from, and sent instructions to at least
1,295 infected computers in 103 different countries. Almost 30 percent of the infected
computers were what might be considered high-value intelligence targets. This
included the ministries of foreign affairs of Bangladesh, Latvia, Indonesia, Philippines,
Brunei, Barbados, and Bhutan; embassies of India, South Korea, Indonesia, Romania,
Cyprus, Malta, Thailand, Taiwan, Portugal, Germany, and Pakistan; the ASEAN
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Secretariat, SAARC (South Asian Association
for Regional Cooperation), and the Asian Development Bank; news organizations; and
an unclassified computer located at NATO headquarters.
The GhostNet system allowed the attackers to gain complete, real-time control over
the infected computers. This includes searching and downloading specific files and
covertly operating any attached devices, including microphones and web cameras. It
is not known whether all of the infected computers were actually being exploited by
the attackers. It is possible that some of the infected computers were infected coincidentally through emails received from an infected computer.
References
“US sees Israel, tight Mideast ally, as spy threat,” by Adam Goldman, New York Times, July 28,
2012.
“U.S. Report Accuses China and Russia of Internet Spying” By Thom Shanker, New York Times,
November 3, 2012.
“Foreign Spies Stealing US Economics Secrets in Cyberspace,” Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive, Washington D.C., November 3, 2011.
continued
Chapter 8, Case 2 Cyberespionage: The Chinese Threat
VIDEO CASE
QUESTIONS
5
1. What are cyberespionage groups stealing from the United States?
2. What does the video claim is the evidence these attacks are coming from China? Is this
believable?
3. What does Adam Siegel in the video claim is the motivation of the Chinese government
for conducting cyberespionage against the United States?
4. Why didn’t Nortel management take the Chinese threat seriously? Why do various
contributors in the video claim that American management does not take the problem
seriously?
5. The video claims the attacks on American corporate and military computer systems are
increasingly sophisticated. Do you believe this is true?
6. Industrial espionage is a kind of technology transfer. The video claims the very DNA of
Google is being drained by China, and that the United States will lose its competitive
advantages with respect to China. Do you agree or disagree? Why? How else is technology transferred? Is it possible to stop technology transfer of any kind?
COPYRIGHT NOTICE
Copyright © 2019 Kenneth Laudon.
This work is protected by United States copyright laws and is provided solely for the use of instructors
in teaching their courses and assessing student learning. Dissemination or sale of any part of this work
(including on the World Wide Web) will destroy the integrity of the work and is not permitted. The work
and materials from this site should not be made available to students except by instructors using the
accompanying text in their classes. All recipients of this work are expected to abide by these restrictions and
to honor the intended pedagogical purposes and the needs of other instructors who rely on these materials.
Management Information Systems 16e
KENNETH C. LAUDON AND JANE P. LAUDON
CHAPTER 9
ACHIEVING OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE AND CUSTOMER INTIMACY: ENTERPRISE
SYSTEMS
CASE 1
Maersk Develops a Global Shipping Management System
SUMMARY:
Maersk, the world’s largest container shipping company, turns to the Internet of Things (IoT)
and business analytics to develop a global enterprise system.
Systems
Maersk Line: Using the Internet of Things, Data, and Analytics to
Change Their Culture and Strength
URL
CASE
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KEC5DQqCykI L= 4:11
A.P. Moller-Maersk is a Danish shipping, logistics, and energy which operates the largest
container fleet in the world with over 600 ships, moving 13 million containers a year, with
340 port facilities in 36 countries, and offices in 130 countries. Standard steel shipping
containers revolutionized world shipping in the latter half of the 20th Century because
they could be used to bundle cargo into unitized loads in a single steel box that could be
easily moved, stored, and re-used. Also called “inter-modal containers”, they can be moved
from ship to rail and trucks without re-loading or breaking up the contents by hand, greatly
adding to the efficiency of world trade. The standard container is 8.5 feet high, and 20 or 40
feet long. Containers are more than just steel boxes. With the growth in global shipments
of food and produce, specialized reefer containers refrigerate their contents to levels of
temperature and humidity needed to preserve food. Maersk ships 25% of the refrigerated
containers in the world.
Maersk refers to itself as the world’s largest shipping company. Founded in 1904 by steamship captain Peter Maersk Moller, in 2018 it accounts for about 15% of the world’s $80 trillion
continued
Chapter 9, Case 1 Maersk Develops a Global Shipping Management System
2
global domestic product, which amounts to an estimated $12 trillion in goods. Today it
operates as two separate divisions: transport and logistics, and energy logistics. In 2017 it
exited the oil exploration business, but retained its energy logistics business. In 2017 it
generated $31 billion in revenue, up 7% from the previous year, and cut its 2016 losses of
nearly $2 billion down to $1.1 billion, a 40% improvement. Maersk has 88,000 employees
worldwide.
While most industries and firms have undergone extensive changes and disruptions in the
last 25 years as digital technology and the Internet have developed, this has not been true
of the global shipping industry. The underlying business processes involved in shipping
today are still largely manual paper-based transactions although individual companies
have made extensive digital investments in ship systems, navigation, communications,
and container tracking. The culture of global shipping firms has focused primarily on the
process of shipping, and not on the processes needed to manage millions of containers,
or provide digital services to their customers. The lack of industry- wide and governmentwide standards has been a major impediment to improving performance using digital
systems. In part this is because of the complexity of shipping goods among 130 countries,
each of which has different kinds of documents like bills of lading, different export-import
documents and procedures, and different legal and financial systems. Firms that use international shipping also have their own unique shipping systems developed by a variety of
enterprise software companies. There are no industry or inter-governmental standards that
address the business processes for managing global container shipping.
Standardization typically comes about in industries when either one or a few companies
dominate the industry, and establish standards (as in the telephone industry), or through
some government intervention that forces standards on industries (as in the automobiles
and pharmaceutical industries). The Internet is an exception to this rule: the Internet
grew out of university and private efforts at first, and then was developed by both nongovernment engineering groups, and government agencies within the United States.
None of these conditions apply to global shipping firms where no one firm dominates the
industry, and international standards have not been imposed by international organizations
such as the United Nations. This is a problem for an industry with over 200 million shipping
containers, six million of them onboard vessels, and making 200 million trips a year! For
each container shipped, there may be up to 30 different parties involved such as government agencies, the shippers and the receivers of goods, port authorities, and tax authorities,
communicating up to 200 times for each container being shipped. The result is costly and
inefficient industry-wide business practices, with significant opportunities for improvement.
Maersk is one global shipping firm that has built an enterprise-wide digital shipping
management system that can reduce fuel consumption of its fleet by optimizing voyage
routing, optimize utilization of its containers, enhance the tracking of containers on its
ships, as well as manage the empty containers waiting to be deployed. One foundation of
continued
Chapter 9, Case 1 Maersk Develops a Global Shipping Management System
3
this effort involves the Internet of Things (IoT): using sensors on every container to continuously monitor its location, and movement, along with the temperature and humidity of its
contents for reefers. A second foundation of Maersk’s system is using business analytics
to achieve optimal fuel and voyage management. Longer term, Maersk is planning to
commercialize this capability by enabling shipping customers to access the system to track
their cargos directly, and to reserve containers for their use based on their own production and shipping plans. The goal, in the end, is to make global shipping as convenient as
domestic UPS or FedEx shipping. Changing the culture at Maersk involves in part becoming
a digital services company with a customer-friendly system, while maintaining its fleet of
ships and containers.
VIDEO CASE
QUESTIONS
1. Why is Maersk’s business model “complex”?
2. What role do IoT sensors play in Maersk’s systems?
3. Why is tracking empty containers so important to efficient operations?
4. What is the “data driven culture” that Maersk is trying to strengthen?
5. Why does Maersk want to give their customers access to their system?
COPYRIGHT NOTICE
Copyright © 2020 Kenneth Laudon.
This work is protected by United States copyright laws and is provided solely for the use of instructors
in teaching their courses and assessing student learning. Dissemination or sale of any part of this work
(including on the World Wide Web) will destroy the integrity of the work and is not permitted. The work
and materials from this site should not be made available to students except by instructors using the
accompanying text in their classes. All recipients of this work are expected to abide by these restrictions and
to honor the intended pedagogical purposes and the needs of other instructors who rely on these materials.

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