APUS Homeland Security & US Intelligence International Relations Instructions: Fully utilize the materials that have been provided in order to support your

APUS Homeland Security & US Intelligence International Relations Instructions: Fully utilize the materials that have been provided in order to support your response.500 words each for each answer with references:1) Discussion Questions: How has the operational relationship between the U.S. intelligence community and the homeland security enterprise evolved? Where is the biggest gap from your perceptive in developing seamless interoperability? Are current authorities the biggest reason for gaps? Describe at least two major intelligence reforms in the past five years. Be specific.Reading resources: Russia’s Election Meddling Is Another American Intelligence Failure (2017)September 11 and the Adaptation Failure of U.S. Intelligence Agencies (2005)The Domestic Intelligence Gap: Progress Since 9/11? (2008)Director of National Intelligence: Statutory Authorities (2011)The State of the Craft: Is Intelligence Reform Working? (2010)FBI: Protecting the Homeland in the 21st Century: Report of the Congressionally-directed 9/11 Review Commission (2015)The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)—Responsibilities and Potential Congressional Concerns (2011)The U.S. Intelligence Community: Selected Cross-Cutting Issues (2016)Protecting the Homeland: Intelligence Integration 15 Years after 9/11 (2017)Recrimination or Reform? The FBI’s Current Crisis Is Not the Bureau’s Biggest Problem (2017)https://apus.intelluslearning.com/lti/#/lesson/148…2) What makes human-trafficking a security, economic, or political threat? What are the risks of maintaining the international policy status quo?Hide Full Description What makes human-trafficking a security, economic, or political threat? What are the risks of maintaining the international policy status quo?Hide Full Description What makes human-trafficking a security, economic, or political threat? What are the risks of maintaining the international policy status quo?3) Adam Smith once wrote that “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.” This seemingly self-evident logic has helped propel economic liberalism as the dominant school of thought in the postwar period. Is economic liberalism (aka free market capitalism) the most efficient and productive economic model we have? What about the alternative schools of thought? Are they serious challengers? Why or why not?Reading resources:Carabelli, Anna M., and Mario A. Cedrini. 2010. “Keynes and the Complexity of International Economic Relations in the Aftermath of World War I.” Journal Of Economic Issues (M.E. Sharpe Inc.) 44, no. 4: 1009-1028. Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed November 22, 2016). http://apus.libguides.com/er.php?course_id=30666Helleiner, E. (2015). Globalising the classical foundations of IPE thought *. Contexto Internacional, 37(3), 975-1010. Retrieved from 33 PAGES http://apus.libguides.com/er.php?course_id=30666Leiteritz, R. J. (2005). INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: The state of the art. Colombia Internacional, (62), 50-63. http://apus.libguides.com/er.php?course_id=30666Waylen, Georgina. 2006. You still don’t understand: Why troubled engagements continue between feminists and (critical) IPE. Review of International Studies 32 (1): 145-64. http://apus.libguides.com/er.php?course_id=30666Gaston, Noel, and Douglas R. Nelson. 2013. “Bridging Trade Theory And Labour Econometrics: THE EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION* BRIDGING TRADE THEORY AND LABOUR ECONOMETRICS: THE EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION.” Journal Of Economic Surveys 27, no. 1: 98-139. Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed November 22, 2016). http://apus.libguides.com/er.php?course_id=30666Brookings Institute. Diversification or specialization: What is the path to growth and development? http://apus.libguides.com/er.php?course_id=30666 •
Introduction the Debate; Realism, Liberalism, Marxism
In what remains a seminal and immensely readable introduction to various worldviews (and their
relationship to economics and the international system), Andrew Ross identifies and describes the three
contending schools/paradigms that dominate analyses of international relations and international
economics:
• Realism
• Liberalism
• Marxism
These perspectives have to do with what is called a “mental map”; mental maps matter because how we
see the world subtly, but vitally, determines how we act in that world. We therefore recommend that
you recognize your own perspective as we proceed through the free trade/protectionist debate in the
coming weeks. Finally, we should also recognize that while the struggle between realists and liberals has
always constituted the essential tensions in U.S. policymaking, the Marxist perspective, or some variant,
has been a contrarian force to influence and challenge efforts to improve economics and the
international system. To be specific, the efforts of a neo-liberal development economist to improve
communities and regions might be viewed and acted against by a Marxist because such efforts are
viewed merely as yet another form of subjugation.
Each of these perspectives embeds underlying assumptions about the central problem of international
relations and economics, the nature of the international system, actors, behavior of actors, the type of
“game” being played (“zero sum” versus “positive sum”), specific agenda, and the relationship between
politics and economics.
Which of these perspectives is most useful for assessing the world today?
For realists—or if we prefer to use Gilpin’s term, economic nationalists—the system now is either
unipolar, multipolar, or in transition from unipolarity to multipolarity. At heart is the idea that power
matters, and power drives economic choices. Thus, protectionism makes sense in many contexts. In
essence, nation-states are the most powerful actors in the international system. This view does not
ignore that there are other actors, but that the international system can best be understood by focusing
on the actions of these primary actors. The international system is also anarchical. Thus, the
international system is characterized by endless competition for power and resources as there is no
central, global authority as is typical in a domestic environment. And, of course, it is assumed that state
actions are rational. That is, all states actions are assumed to the be the result of a cost benefit
analysis.
Michael Mastanduno of Dartmouth College also examines three alternative images of the evolving
international order; one, in particular has relevance to this course: Geoëconomic Competition. The end
of great power military competition does not mean the end of great power competition. That
competition has shifted to another arena: the economic and technological. “Competition for markets,
raw materials, high value-added employment, and mastery of advanced technology becomes a
surrogate for traditional military competition.” Great powers can be expected to mobilize for
international economic competition. States will be sensitive to relative gains or relative economic
position─some states benefit from economic exchange more than others. Major powers will organize
their relations with weaker states to enhance their position in major power geoëconomic competition.
We can thus expect to see regional economic blocs─in North (and South) America, Europe, East Asia─led
by major powers.
There is a realist alternative to this, of course. States emerging in power will align against those who
might otherwise dominate the international economic system. Brazil, for example—although it faces
truly daunting domestic economic challenges—has the potential to emerge in the next decades as a
world economic power. It seems only natural that there will be resistance to the Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA) in the near future because Brazil would reasonably rather dominate a newly emerging
economic block (say within Mercosur—or, in Portuguese, Mercosul) than itself be dominated by a larger
power (the U.S.) in an older economic order.
We cannot leave this discussion on realism, however, without acknowledging Robert Gilpin’s thoughts
on economic nationalism and “hegemonic stability.”Gilpin openly states that the issue of “free trade
versus protectionism” lies at the heart of the conflict between economic liberals and economic
nationalists. Nationalists regard
protectionism as an end in itself, while liberals regard protectionism at best as a necessary but
temporary solution on the road to a wider system of free trade.
Further, employing the original thoughts of Charles Kindleberger, the hegemon has the responsibility to
guarantee provision to the collective goods of an open trading system and stable currency. Admittedly,
the hegemon as Gilpin describes will degrade and lose power over time. Nonetheless, the U.S. as
hegemon, needs to manage crises, the international debt problem, the increase in trade protectionism,
and other issues of mutual international economic concern.
Thus, in your final reading, you might notice how Soederberg deftly updates the economic
nationalist/mercantilist arguments of the past to make it relevant for capital control and self-protection
of economically powerful states in an age of global integration. Admittedly, this is not an easy read, but
we look forward to your comments and discussion points.
Though few have seemed to notice it, there does seem to be an inherent contradiction in “hegemonic
stability theory” and its supposed roots in the realist perspective. Specifically, the realist perspective
describes the international system as “anarchic” (which from the Greek literally means “without a
leader”) and therefore is a “self-help” order for political action and economic choices, yet “hegemonic
stability” suggests that the economic system cannot function well or long without the active presence of
the “hegemon”—the “leader.”
The Liberal Perspective and Its Economic Contribution to Strategic Issues
How do liberals see the structure of the international system and how does that relate to economics?
Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University Joseph Nye (whose work with Robert
Keohane you read here on “Complex Interdependence”) describes the international system as a
wedding cake: at the top level, is the predominance of the U.S. unipolar military power; in the middle
level, the basis of the system is tricolor (US, Europe, and Japan) and has been for decades; at the bottom
layer are issues of transnational interdependence—whether it be banking or criminal networks. Clearly,
the middle level of the cake is shifting to a wider dispersion in an age of global integration.
Economic liberalism privileges the individual (whether the person or firm) as the focus and key actor in
human society. It assumes that there is very little need for state interference (or other forms of
centralized oversight) in ordering our economic discourse as “the market” emerges and evolves
“naturally” to maximize efficiency and optimal output. There is a clear separation of economic progress
from retrograde politics.
Jessica Mathews, in an influential piece in Foreign Affairs in 1995 described as well a fundamental
“power shift” that was taking place the would change the bases of how states act and how power and
economics determine order. That is, he argues that the traditional Westphalian nation-state system in
effect since 1648…of governing autonomy and monopoly of authority….is breaking down as newly
emerging global issues, actors, and financial instruments force states to share power.
Consider these issues in this section as we nominally mean to examine the free trade versus
protectionist debate—increasing resource scarcity, rapid demographic shifts to urban areas, organized
crime, drug trafficking, ethnic conflict, environmental decline,
poverty. In the final sessions of the course, we will consider what relevance these issues have to
economics and the international system.
Has global integration left governments behind?
Is it markets rather than governments that make the rules?
Are international institutions indeed becoming more important?
Are there alternatives to the state?
What might those alternatives look like?
Well, consider the following:
The European Union—and more specifically the European Monetary Union. Subnational actors such as
the fifty American states, most of which have trade offices in other countries─states have developed
economic ties with other parts of the world and haven’t worked through Washington to do so.
The World Trade Organization.
The International Telecommunications Union.
The International Standards Organization─a business NGO.
The International Security Markets Association, a private regulator that oversees international trade in
private securities markets.
The Marxist Perspective and Its Economic Relevance to Strategic Issues
Gilpin’s useful and readable piece on the “Three Ideologies of Political Economy” describes the Marxist
view as:[In the overall corpus of Marxist writings, there are four essential elements.] The first element is
the dialectical approach to knowledge and society that defines the nature of reality as dynamic and
conflictual . . . The second element is a material approach to history; the development of productive
forces and economic activities is central to historical change . . . The third is a general view of capitalist
development; the capitalist mode of production and its destiny are governed by a set of “economic laws
of motion of modern society.”
The fourth is a normative commitment to socialism . . . [Yet the] principal weakness of Marxism as a
theory of international political economy results from its failure to appreciate the role of political and
strategic factors in international relations.
As John Cassidy suggests, is Marx indeed “The Next Thinker”? Why would an investment banker say that
“The longer I spend on Wall Street, the more convinced I am that Marx was right”? Was Marx right?
Should we continue to take Marx and Marxism/neo- Marxism seriously? Is “economics the driving force
in human history”? Is history the history of class struggle? Is the fundamental divide in society between
those who own the means of production and those “whose only asset is their capacity for work”? What
does class struggle look like on the international level? Is it possible that Marx was wrong about
communism but right about capitalism? Has anyone since better understood the dynamics of
capitalism? Does capitalism always tend toward monopoly, as Marx argued? Where does power lie in a
capitalist society? Consider this provocative statement by Marx: “The executive of the modern state is
but a committee for managing the common affairs of the bourgeoisie.” In an age of corporate scandals
and the continuing aggregation of power by the few, Marxists would only confirm their long-held views.
•
Intelligence Reform and the HSE
In 2004, the Hoover Institute, a Stanford University based think tank noted,
The intelligence community’s failure to warn with the clarity needed to disrupt the conspiracy of
September 11 and its less-than-stellar performance in assessing Iraqi WMD programs highlight both the
dangers to security and the demands for strategic intelligence in the twenty-first century. The
community can hardly be trusted to do an honest and balanced critique of its performance in the wake
of these events. It comprises numerous intelligence agencies, each with its own set of entrenched
interests. As it stands today, the intelligence agencies are bureaucratically modeled after the
management layers and hierarchies of the blue-chip companies of old, such as IBM.”
This is quite a statement regarding the Intelligence Community and its’ intersection with homeland
security. But is it a fair assessment??
The al Qaeda quad terrorist attacks in September 2001 were not a surprise to American intelligence
agencies, who were expecting something major that summer or fall. However, what was a surprise was
that the attack was not overseas but directed at homeland — as well as the fully fueled commercial
airliners being used as suicide cruise missiles employed against us domestically by terrorists who had
infiltrated the country months earlier. The 9/11 Commission Report (2004) laid bare the many mistakes
by government agencies such as the lack of effective inter and intra-agency information sharing, and the
perception that the intelligence community (IC) was a leaderless and tribal constellation of various
uncoordinated agencies. The CIA and FBI did not share effective what each agency knew about al Qaeda,
neither agency shared with state and local officials that terrorists were known to be among us, and the
NSA had collected (but not translated) communications that may have prevented the attack if analyzed
in context of the intelligence held by other agencies (Bamford, 2015). Some of the major resulting
reforms of the IC included the creation of a Director of National Intelligence, a National Counter
Terrorism Center (NCTC), and the creation of the vast Department of Homeland Security with its own
intelligence and analysis office. There has been a new emphasis on Homeland Security focused
intelligence.
Another hotly debated topic was the concept to create a new domestic intelligence agency along the
lines of the British Mi-5 or reshaping the FBI to perform such a role (Burch, 2007). There was also
consideration to absorb the FBI into the new DHS as it was created. Ultimately the decision was made to
keep the FBI separate from DHS and to keep the mandate to be a law enforcement agency as well as
protect the nation from terrorists within the homeland. “In response to criticisms of its intelligence
capabilities, the FBI over the last decade has introduced a series of reforms intended to transform the
Bureau from a largely reactive law enforcement agency focused on criminal investigation into a more
proactive, agile, flexible, and intelligence agency that can prevent acts of terrorism” (Bjelopera, 2013, p.
14). Within the FBI a new National Security Branch “which integrated the FBI’s Counterterrorism and
Counterintelligence Divisions with the (Directorate of Intelligence) DI, the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Directorate, and the Terrorist Screening Center…established Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs), which
could be viewed as a cornerstone of his reforms, at each of the FBI’s 56 field offices in an effort to
improve the Bureau’s intelligence capacity by combining its intelligence and investigative capabilities”
(Bjelopera, 2013, p. 15).
In short, the IC needs to provide support for national security efforts overall and in particular the
homeland security enterprise with timely and accurate intelligence to secure the nation. However,
reforming the 16 various member agencies and organizations of the intelligence community with diverse
and sometimes competing interests remains a challenge.
Noted the same Hoover Institute Report, that started this lesson,
Sharpening the dull intelligence blade will require a strong hand from outside the intelligence
community. Left to their own devices, the CIA’s do and di managements have no incentive to bring
about reforms; they have clearly vested interests in the perpetuation of a system in which they benefit
regardless of the worth of intelligence to American policymakers. CIA’s persistent operational and
analytic shortcomings elude quick and easy fixes. Instead of probing deeply and critically into these
“software” problems, outside reviewers are drawn by an almost gravitational force to look at
“hardware” and bureaucratic wire diagram changes as vehicles for reform. The new commission would
be well advised to look for ways to nurture operational and analytic talent and avoid bureaucratic
changes that are akin to rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.
References
9/11 Commission Report (2004). Retrieved from https://9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf
Bamford, J. (2015, July 21). Missed calls: Is the NSA lying about its failure to prevent 9/11? Foreign
Policy. Retrieved from http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/21/missed-calls-nsa-terrorism-osama-binladen-mihdhar/
Bjelopera, J. P. (2013). The Federal Bureau of Investigation and terrorism investigations. Congressional
Research Service. Retrieved from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41780.pdf
Burch. (2007). A domestic intelligence agency for the United States? A comparative analysis of domestic
intelligence agencies and their implications for homeland security. Homeland
Security Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.hsaj.org/articles/147
Nelson, R. (2013). Homeland security at a crossroads: Evolving DHS to meet the next generation of
threats. Retrieved https://www.csis.org/analysis/homeland-security-crossroads-evolving-dhs-meetnext-generation-threats
SIGAR
Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction
ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES: PERSISTENT
PROBLEMS EXIST IN MONITORING BULK
CASH FLOWS AT KABUL INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT
This product was completed under SIGAR’s Office of Special Projects, the Special
Inspector General’s response team created to examine emerging issues in prompt,
actionable reports to federal agencies and the Congress. The work was conducted
pursuant to the Special Inspector General’s authorities and responsibilities under the
National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008 (P.L. 110-181).
DECEMBER 11, 2012
SIGAR SP-13-1
SIGAR SP-13-1 Anti-Corruption / Currency Movement at KBL
December 11, 2012
The Honorable Janet Napolitano
Secretary of Homeland Security
The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton
Secretary of State
The Honorable James B. Cunningham
U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan
The international community, including the U.S. government, has long held serious concerns about the flow of
cash out of the Kabul International Airport (KBL). According to the Congressional Research Service, an
estimated $4.5 billion was taken out Afghanistan in 2011. 1 While large cash movements are typical in
Afghanistan because it is a cash-based economy, these bulk cash flows raise the risk of money laundering and
bulk cash smuggling—tools often used to finance terrorist, narcotics, and other illicit operations.
Recognizing the seriousness of this problem, a civilian-military interagency working group based at the
U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan developed the “bulk cash flow action plan” in 2010 to better regulate cash flow at
KBL. 2 That same year, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) pledged to adopt and
implement regulations or laws within one year to govern the bulk transfers of cash outside the country. 3
In July 2011, SIGAR reported on U.S. government efforts to strengthen oversight over the flow of U.S. funds
through the Afghan economy, including the bulk cash flow action plan. 4 We initiated this review in August
2012, to follow up on concerns we raised in that report regarding implementation of the plan, particularly
Operation FinTRAX—an initiative to place bulk currency counters at KBL to monitor the outflow of funds from
Afghanistan. 5 We conducted a site visit to the airport to observe the use of bulk currency counters and other
measures designed to monitor outflows of currency. We also interviewed U.S. officials responsible for helping
1U.S. officials report that only about 5 percent of the population use banks and 90 percent use informal cash transfer
“hawalas” systems. See Congressional Research Service report, “Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government
Performance”, November 30, 2012, p.48.
2This
action plan outlined 33 sh…
Purchase answer to see full
attachment